

英語の抄訳

This report synthesises the findings of a multi-country collaborative research project aimed at reexamining how populist attitudes can be effectively measured in contemporary political contexts. While populism as a field of study has expanded significantly over the past decade, the discipline faces a major empirical challenge: existing measures of citizens' populist attitudes fail to capture support for populist actors when these actors hold political power. This problem, which reveals a growing mismatch between supply-side analyses of populist rhetoric and demand-side analyses of popular attitudes, motivates the present study. Drawing on original surveys conducted in several countries—including the United States, the Philippines, Brazil, and Japan—the project identifies conceptual gaps in existing scales and proposes a new, context-robust measure of populist attitudes.

1. Background and Research Purpose

Since the mid-2010s, scholars have increasingly focused on citizens' populist attitudes—how strongly individuals endorse worldviews characterised by anti-elitism, people-centrism, and Manichaeian moral dualism. A major turning point came with the creation of the populist attitudes scale (PAS) by Akkerman, Mudde, and Zaslove (2014), which operationalised these theoretical components into survey items. The PAS was subsequently adopted in the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) Module 5 and applied across dozens of countries between 2016 and 2020.

However, the PAS contains an embedded assumption: that “elites” are primarily politicians. The anti-elitism items consistently prompt respondents to evaluate politicians (“most politicians are corrupt,” “politicians don’t care about people like me,” etc.), and the people-centrism item (“ordinary people, not politicians, should make the most important decisions”) also treats politicians as the default elite. This raises significant problems when these very politicians are themselves populists who claim to speak for the people. The scale’s design reflects a world where populists operate outside power, positioning themselves against incumbents. But the contemporary world increasingly features “populists in power,” whose supporters may not interpret “politicians” as a corrupt elite in the manner the scale assumes.

This design flaw produces empirical contradictions. For instance, as documented in Jungkunz, Fahey, and Hino (2021), citizens in Italy, Germany, and the Netherlands who score high on

the PAS are more likely to vote for populist parties—consistent with theory. But in Hungary and Turkey, where populists govern, individuals with high PAS scores are actually *less* likely to vote for the ruling populists. The same pattern appears in Japan, where the Liberal Democratic Party, despite not being a typical populist party, was treated in analyses as representing a comparable context: populist attitude scores negatively correlated with support for the incumbent. Such inconsistencies raise fundamental concerns about the validity of existing measures.

The present study addresses this issue by developing new survey items designed to capture anti-elitist orientations beyond the realm of politicians. Modern populism frequently targets a wide range of non-political elites—journalists, academics, bureaucrats, business leaders, and even foreign actors—who are portrayed as corrupt, distant from ordinary citizens, or aligned with global interests. Populists in the United States, Hungary, and Japan have routinely mobilised against such groups, employing narratives about the “deep state,” biased media, or academic elitism. Recognising this broader elite structure, the research constructs and empirically tests an expanded battery of items that capture distrust across six elite categories: politicians, bureaucrats, journalists, academic experts, business executives, and foreign forces.

The study also reconsiders the measurement of people-centrism. Existing people-centrism items focus primarily on procedural elements (e.g., “ordinary citizens should make important decisions”). Yet when populists hold office, their supporters may believe the government already reflects the will of the people, diminishing the appeal of further procedural demands. The report instead highlights the importance of moralised *homogeneity*—the belief that “the people” form a virtuous and coherent community. This dimension, emphasised in more recent scholarship, may capture deeper and more context-independent features of populist worldviews.

2. Conceptual Contributions

The report identifies three major conceptual problems within current populist attitude measures:

1. An excessively narrow conception of “elites,” assumed to be only politicians. This fails to reflect contemporary political dynamics, particularly in countries where populists govern and direct their anti-elite rhetoric toward non-political actors.
2. A procedural form of people-centrism that is highly context-dependent. When supporters feel that their preferred populist leader already embodies the people’s will, procedural demands lose relevance.

3. Overreliance on additive scaling techniques that treat all subcomponents of populism as interchangeable contributors, rather than necessary conditions.

To address these concerns, the research advances several innovations. First, it proposes a broader conception of anti-elitism, measured through distrust of multiple elite groups. Second, it emphasizes the importance of moral homogeneity rather than procedural sovereignty as the core of people-centrism. Third, it adopts a measurement strategy informed by logical rules: anti-elitism should be captured using a *maximum score* across elite targets (reflecting substitutability across contexts), whereas the three components of populism—anti-elitism, homogeneity, and Manichaeism—should be combined using a *minimum score* to reflect that each is a necessary condition for populist ideology.

3. Empirical Findings

The project analyzes how distrust of diverse elites, people-centrism, and homogeneity relate to support for populist parties across several countries.

A. Anti-elitism and Voting Behavior

Using newly designed items, the study shows that attitudes toward different elites have distinct effects:

- **Distrust of politicians** predicts populist voting only when populists are in opposition; when they govern, the relationship reverses.
- **Distrust of bureaucrats** exhibits similar contextual sensitivity, reflecting their association with government institutions.
- **Distrust of journalists and academic experts**, however, consistently predicts populist voting across all contexts, regardless of whether populists hold power. These groups appear to function as universal symbolic elites within populist narratives.
- **Distrust of business leaders** shows mixed or negative relationships, perhaps reflecting less frequent targeting of business elites in the countries studied.

These findings demonstrate the inadequacy of relying solely on anti-politician items to measure anti-elitism in contexts of populist governance.

B. People-centrism and Homogeneity

Analyses of surveys from the 2024 U.S. presidential election and the 2022 Philippine presidential election reveal that:

- **Procedural people-centrism (PLP) and popular sovereignty (SOV)** items lose explanatory power—or even reverse their expected effect—when populists control the

government. For example, Trump supporters in 2024 did not endorse procedural claims about returning power to ordinary citizens once Trump was elected; indeed, endorsement of these items correlated negatively with support for Trump in post-election surveys.

- **Moral homogeneity (HOM)** items, in contrast, consistently predict populist support both before and after elections in all countries. Beliefs such as “the people share common values” or “ordinary people are good and honest” form a stable ideological foundation that transcends political circumstances.

These results strongly indicate that moralized homogeneity, rather than procedural people-centrism, should form the backbone of demand-side populism measures.

C. The New Composite Measure

Drawing on these insights, the project constructs a revised composite measure of populist attitudes. This index:

1. Uses the maximum score across elite groups to capture context-specific anti-elitism.
2. Combines anti-elitism, homogeneity, and Manichaeism using a logical minimum rule, reflecting their status as jointly necessary components of populist ideology.

Tests across the U.S., Philippines, and Brazil show that the new measure successfully predicts voting for populist candidates in all political contexts: when populists are in opposition, when they govern, and when they have recently lost power.

In stark contrast, traditional scales repeatedly fail to predict populist support under governing populists—precisely where accurate measurement is most crucial.

4. Significance and Implications

The research contributes substantially to populism scholarship in several ways.

1. It resolves a central empirical puzzle in populism research.

The long-observed mismatch between populist rhetoric and measured populist attitudes under governing populists is not an anomaly but a measurement artifact. By reconceptualizing anti-elitism and people-centrism, the study provides a coherent explanation for previously contradictory findings.

2. It offers a theoretically grounded, cross-nationally applicable measurement tool.

The new measure captures the core ideological content of populism without being distorted by local political circumstances. This allows researchers to conduct more meaningful cross-country comparisons, including cases where populists wield executive power.

3. It enhances understanding of the sociopolitical bases of populism.

Findings illustrate that distrust of non-political elites—academics, experts, journalists—plays a central role in populist mobilization and should receive greater scholarly attention. The research also highlights the importance of moral worldview and group identity in sustaining populist support.

4. It aligns demand-side measures with supply-side realities.

Populist rhetoric in many countries clearly targets non-political elites and constructs a moralized vision of “the people.” The proposed scale more accurately reflects these patterns, reconnecting measurement tools with empirical political dynamics.

5. It lays groundwork for future theoretical and empirical developments.

By demonstrating the limitations of existing instruments and offering a validated alternative, the research facilitates deeper exploration of populism’s evolution, including how populist attitudes change when populists enter or exit government.

5. Conclusion

This study identifies fundamental weaknesses in established populist attitude measures and offers a robust alternative suited to the complexities of modern political landscapes. The core insight is that populist attitudes are not captured reliably when measurement tools assume that political elites are the exclusive target of populist hostility or that procedural people-centrism is universally applicable. Instead, contemporary populism is rooted in a broader constellation of elite antagonisms and in a moralized vision of a homogeneous and virtuous people.

By expanding anti-elitism to encompass multiple elite groups, redefining people-centrism through homogeneity, and applying a logical structure to integrate the components of populist ideology, the study produces a measurement strategy that performs consistently across political contexts. The new index successfully predicts support for populist actors regardless of whether they are in opposition, hold office, or have recently left power. This achievement marks a significant step forward in ensuring that empirical research on populism remains conceptually accurate and democratically relevant.